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To know or not to know: should crimes regarding photographs of their 
child sexual abuse be disclosed to now-adult, unknowing victims? 
 




This paper considers the unexplored question of whether unaware crime victims have rights or 
interests in knowing and not knowing information pertaining to the crime(s) committed against 
them. Our specific focus is on whether crimes regarding abusive images (AI) should be 
disclosed to now-adult victims of child sexual abuse who feature in them. Because these issues 
have not been addressed in the victimology or criminological literature, we utilise literature in 
another discipline - health care ethics and law - to inform our analysis. Through engaging with 
the debate on the right to know and not to know information concerning one’s genetic status, 
we develop a conceptualisation of the issues regarding unknowing AI victims. A rights-based 
conceptualisation proves to be largely inappropriate; we contend that, instead, it would be more 
productive to look to unknowing AI victims’ interests. We argue that the interests at stake are 
grounded in autonomy and/or spatial privacy, and that in order to find a way to resolve the 
disclosure dilemma, these interests must be considered alongside consequentialist concerns; 
disclosing information regarding AI could empower now-adult victims but could well cause 
them (further) harm. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for victimology. 
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Imagine the following scenario. During their investigation of crimes related to abusive images, 
law enforcement agents (LEAs) successfully identify the very young victim - a toddler - who 
features in the images. The images are historic, and the victim is now an adult. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the victim is aware of the images and, because of their very young age 
at the time the crimes were committed, they may remain unaware of the actual abuse. Now 
imagine that victim is you. Would you want to be informed of the crimes and the existence of 
the images? 
   
The identification of children who feature in abusive images (AI) has always posed real 
challenges (Holland, 2005; Carr and Hilton, 2011).1 Victim identification has been coordinated 
nationally, but only by one underfunded unit within the Child Exploitation and Online 
Protection Centre (CEOP) (Gillespie, 2011: 332-333) and, in 2014, the NSPCC claimed that 
police were ‘overwhelmed’ by the amount of AI collected from seized computers (Conway, 
2014). Although victim identification remains far from straightforward, 2014 saw the launch 
of the national Child Abuse Images Database (CAID), a system designed to speed up the 
process of cataloguing and analysing images (Home Office, 2018). All police forces now have 
access to CAID and there are clear indications that it has increased the number of victims being 
identified and quickened up the identification process (Home Office, 2018). The rolling out of 
CAID and greater success in terms of victim identification are significant, positive 
developments but, at the same time, they have increased the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
dilemma which is the concern of this paper. For where victims are successfully identified and 
2 
 
located, this raises difficult ethical issues pertaining to whether to disclose the existence of AI 
to them.  
 
We note at the outset that this paper is not focused on cases where the identified victims are 
still children. For such victims, there are significant and urgent matters that must be addressed 
following their identification and location, such as ascertaining whether they are now in a safe 
environment and whether they have received counselling support, matters beyond the scope of 
this paper (Palmer, 2005).2 Rather, our focus is upon images depicting historic child sexual 
abuse where the identified victim is now an adult. Where the images depict historic crimes, 
four different scenarios can be envisaged. First, LEAs may identify a victim who is aware that 
her abuse was recorded in photographs and that these photographs were disseminated (V1).3 
Secondly, they might identify a victim who is aware of the AI, but not that they were distributed 
to others (V2). In the third possible scenario, they may identify a victim who is aware of her 
sexual abuse but not of the AI because they were taken covertly (V3). Finally, LEAs could be 
faced with the scenario with which we began this paper: they could identify a victim who was 
abused at a very young age and is thus unaware both of the sexual abuse and the AI (V4), as 
might occur, for example, when unaware toddlers or pre-school victims become adults (Anon, 
2010; Morris, 2010). To complicate matters further, it is highly likely that, when they identify 
a victim featured in a photograph, LEAs will not know which of these scenarios they face 
unless they have identified a victim already known to them and are aware of the degree of her 
knowledge regarding the images. 
 
In each of these scenarios, there is a substantial risk that disclosing the abuse and/or 
existence of the AI for Vs 3 and 4, or the fact that they have been accessed by others for Vs1 
and 2, will cause the now-adult victim (further) harm. Whilst still in its infancy, research 
involving AI victims and counsellors and therapists who treat them has revealed that, besides 
the trauma caused by the actual abuse, AI victims suffer additional, unique psychological harm 
if they are aware of the existence of AI and that these images have been distributed on the 
internet (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2018; Martin, 2015; Martin, 2016; von Weiler et al., 2010; 
Lindauer et al., 2014). The availability of the AI for others to view means that achieving 
“closure” for victims can be impossible. Leonard’s research has shown that ‘... we cannot 
approach [these victims] as post trauma as they are still very much living and experiencing the 
trauma... at any time, on any day, in any country someone... could be looking at the pictures of 
them and using them as sexual stimulus for their own self-gratification’ (Leonard, 2010: 254). 
 
Even in the case of V1, who is already aware that the AI exist and have been distributed, 
informing her that they have been found in the possession of another offender who has 
downloaded them from the internet, for example, could cause her additional distress by 
reminding her again of her abuse and the fact that the images are still ‘out there’ for others to 
access (Leonard, 2010). Yet at the same time, it could be argued that victims have an interest 
in knowing this information pertaining to themselves (Palmer, 2005: 65) and a failure to 
disclose would deny them the opportunity to take self-ownership of this experience and deal 
with it. Thus, the crucial question is whether to disclose or not to disclose and this may depend, 
in part, on the category of victim which LEAs face. There is next to no research on how to 
resolve this dilemma, which also poses difficulties for counsellors treating unknowing AI 
victims (Martin, 2015; Martin, 2016). Palmer (2005: 65) has noted that ‘[w]e know little about 
the impact of such a revelation on the now adult “child victim” and need to think strategically 
about why and when such a disclosure may be necessary…’. Moreover, Taylor and Quayle 
(2003: 207) have expressed the view that police policy guidelines on the identification of now 




In order to begin to address this paucity of research, this paper’s unique contribution is to 
provide an ethical, theoretical analysis of the issues and to frame this analysis (and a suggested 
way forward) around the victim’s interest in knowing information pertaining to herself and her 
history, and her interest in not knowing this information. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
an issue which has not been explored in the victimology and criminological literature. Our 
analysis should be of significance beyond the particular AI context, since it will resonate with 
other situations in which victims are unaware of crimes committed against them (assuming that 
information about the crime subsequently comes to the attention of the authorities). Take, for 
instance, a victim who is raped whilst unconscious and remains unaware of the rape (Anon, 
2015; Anon, 2016; Gardner, 2007); victims of a gynaecologist who takes explicit photographs 
during pelvic examinations without their knowledge (Pearce, 2014; Klosterman, 2014); 
unaware victims of ‘revenge pornography’ (Gillespie, 2015); and unwitting victims of a fake 
charity scam fraud (Button et al., 2009). This also suggests that there are important implications 
for the victimology literature: is there a need to consider another typology of crime victim – 
the unaware or unknowing victim – alongside existing conceptions of, for example, the ideal 
and non-ideal victim (Christie, 1986), the innocent victim (Mendelsohn, 1963) and the hidden 
victim (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012)? This little explored4 category of victim raises 
numerous issues which merit consideration for future research - such as, for instance, whether 
it should also encompass victims who do not construe another’s behaviour towards them as a 
criminal offence (Mooney and Ost, 2013) -  alongside the disclosure dilemma which is the 
focus on this paper. 
 
This paper unfolds as follows. First, because this disclosure dilemma has not been addressed 
in victimology or criminological debates, we look to literature in another academic discipline 
to inform our analysis. A sustained exploration of the so-called rights to know and not to know 
personal and sensitive information concerning oneself has occurred in health care ethics and 
law (HCE&L) literature regarding the processing of genetic information (Chadwick et al., 
2014; Laurie, 2002; Harris and Keywood, 2001).5 Our purpose is not to claim that the genetic 
information context and the disclosure dilemma regarding AI victims are identical, for they are 
not; there are different issues at stake. In particular, there is a clear contrast in terms of the 
content of the information - information regarding an individual’s health versus information 
concerning the existence and distribution of a photographic record of a sexual crime committed 
against a person when she was a child. This gives rise to distinct psychological ramifications. 
Moreover, given that it is often a child’s family member or other trusted adult who creates the 
AI (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2018: 242), disclosure may well have different ramifications for 
family relationships than the revelation of genetic information pertaining to a person’s health 
has, as we shall discuss. However, in both cases, it is personal and sensitive information, the 
disclosure of which could be life-changing.  As we shall see, reflecting on the analysis in the 
HCE&L literature and the similarities and differences between the two contexts can help 
inform an appropriate conceptualisation of the issues in the context of unknowing AI victims, 
which can, in turn, assist in finding a way to resolving the disclosure dilemma.  
 
Secondly, we reveal the difficulties created if the issue of informing or not informing 
unaware victims of crimes committed against them is conceptualised as rights-based. Instead, 
we argue that the matter is best viewed through the lens of interests in knowing and not-
knowing, because such a conceptualisation enables a more constructive balancing assessment 
of the issues at stake. Thirdly, informed by the theoretical analysis in the genetic information 
debate, we argue that the interests at stake are grounded in autonomy and/or spatial privacy 
(the latter being a form of psychological separateness or state of not knowing). In order to find 
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a way to resolve the disclosure dilemma, these interests must be considered alongside the 
consequences of disclosure: revealing information regarding AI (and sexual abuse for V4) 
could positively empower now-adult victims but could well cause them further harm by way 
of serious psychological harm and suffering. The way in which these interests and concerns 
can be balanced is addressed in our penultimate section, where we evaluate the arguments for 
and against disclosure for the different categories of AI victims. Finally, we draw the elements 
of our analysis together to formulate a proposed way forward to resolve the disclosure dilemma 
regarding unknowing AI victims, and consider the implications for victimology. 
 
 
A right to know and not to know in HCE&L (genetic information) and its possible 
application to the AI context 
 
The right to know and not to know about genetic information first began to be debated in the 
1990s following significant developments in genetic screening (Chadwick et al., 2014). In 
some cases, such screening can provide certain knowledge that an individual will develop 
condition X, in others, the person’s genetic status will provide less precise information 
comprising of the percentage risk that they will develop condition Y. These opportunities to 
undergo genetic testing for late onset disorders such as Huntington’s disease,6 for instance, 
have given rise to numerous ethical dilemmas pertaining to disclosure. For our purposes, the 
first of the most germane of these relates to the fact that some individuals at risk of having such 
a disease - because, for example, one of their parents has been diagnosed with the condition - 
would wish to be tested to gain knowledge about whether they will develop the disease and to 
structure their lives accordingly. If tested, these individuals could claim a right to know the 
results of the genetic screening. Conversely, someone may initially choose to be tested but then 
decide that they would prefer not to know the results rather than take the risk of being given a 
devastating, life-changing diagnosis. The second pertinent dilemma arises where the particular 
disease is hereditary and a late onset single gene disorder, as is Huntington’s. If one family 
member is screened and the result is positive, it is 100% certain that one of his parents will 
have the gene and there is a 50% chance that each of his siblings will (Laurie, 2014b). This test 
will thereby indicate the genetic status of these individuals (since Huntington’s is late onset, 
they might not have symptoms even if they have the dominant gene), but they may be 
completely unaware that their relative has had the genetic test. Should they have a right to know 
about this test and its outcome? And should they have a right not to know the outcome? 
 
There is a noteworthy parallel here relating to the contrasting levels of knowledge possessed 
by the various parties in the genetic and AI contexts. The AI disclosure dilemma that we have 
introduced involves a spectrum of victims, some of who may have incomplete knowledge of 
the existence of the personal, sensitive information concerning crimes committed against them, 
or no knowledge whatsoever. Take, for instance, AI V1 (who knows her abuse was recorded 
and that the AI were then distributed) and the person who requests genetic testing: both are 
both aware that the information does or could exist. In contrast, relatives who are unaware of 
the genetic test and its implications for their health and AI Vs3 and 4 possess a lack of 
knowledge of the information’s existence. The same is true for V2 if the information relates to 
the distribution of the AI. This puts the person who requests genetic testing and AI V1 in a 
different position to unaware relatives and AI Vs2-4.  
 
What conceptual grounding exists for considering whether these different parties have a 
right to know or not to know the information in question? In the HCE&L literature, the 
discourse of rights to know and not to know tends to be grounded in the interests of autonomy 
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and privacy (Borry et al., 2014; Chico, 2015). Looking first to autonomy and working with the 
definition of autonomy as ‘self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others 
and from certain limitations such as inadequate understanding that prevent meaningful choice’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013: 101), there is an obvious connection with the right to know. 
For if there is significant information pertaining to A’s health and/or medical treatment that B 
possesses and denies A the knowledge of, then B prevents A from making meaningful choices 
relating to her self-governance. But the grounding of this right in autonomy has been contested 
where the individual has not previously expressed a wish to know the information. Husted has 
cautioned that we should be wary of conceiving autonomy as the basis for the right to know in 
cases where the disclosure is unsolicited, because this leads to both an apparent denial and 
enhancement of autonomy. Autonomy might seem to be denied, in that disclosing information 
deprives the individual of her autonomy because the decision is made by the discloser. 
However, this disclosure is made for the purposes of enhancing the individual’s autonomy by 
providing her with significant information that she should have available to her as the decision-
maker regarding her life (Husted, 2014). Yet, ultimately, Husted goes on to conclude that what 
might seem to be an enhancement of autonomy actually leads to ‘morally forced choices’ 
(Husted, 2014: 36), since being informed that one is the carrier of a genetic condition which 
brings with it serious health problems could lead to an individual turning away from the life-
choices they had previously chosen to embark upon. They may decide, for example, not to have 
children, or to avoid any serious emotional involvement with others.  
 
This ambiguity suggests that autonomy might not be as secure a foundation for the right to 
know as it initially seems, unless the individual has expressed a clear prior wish to know the 
information in question and has exercised a meaningful choice regarding it (Keren-Paz, 2017: 
422). Whilst such a prior wish will exist in the genetic testing context where the individual has 
requested that tests be carried out (provided she does not subsequently decide that she no longer 
wishes to know), it will not exist where a relative is unaware that a family member has 
undergone a genetic test, the results of which have serious implications for her health. Nor will 
it exist for unknowing AI victims. In other words, for autonomy to be relevant, the individual 
must know that there is something to know. This argument might be challenged by the 
existence of a growing body of empirical research which indicates that, when asked whether 
they would wish to be told about genetic information that they were unaware of, a significant 
number of study participants would wish to be told (Wolff et al., 2007; Middleton et al., 2016; 
Heaton and Chico, 2016; Dheensa et al., 2016). Notably, it was especially in the case of genetic 
information about a condition which steps can be taken to avoid, or where treatment is 
available, that disclosure of such previously unknown information was favoured (Heaton and 
Chico, 2016: 114; Middleton et al., 2016: 23). However, fewer participants state that they 
would wish to be informed of a fatal genetic condition for which there is no treatment (Dheensa 
et al., 2016: 294), and some would not wish to know regardless of how serious the non-
preventable condition is (Heaton and Chico, 2016: 115). It should be borne in mind that these 
studies only provide hypothetical views; that is, participants were asked what their views would 
be in supposititious circumstances and ‘it is impossible to know how closely these [hypothetical 
views and views in a real-life situation] are aligned’ (Middleton et al., 2016: 28, Heaton and 
Chico, 2016: 118; Dheensa et al., 2016: 291). Also, the fact that not all participants would wish 
to be informed also means that it cannot be assumed that disclosure of unknown genetic 
information would support autonomy, for such an assumption would fail to take account of the 
‘beliefs and preferences of [each] individual…’ (Middleton et al., 2016: 28). Only a prior 
expressed wish to know the information in question would reveal a particular individual’s 
autonomous views accurately. Moreover, no such empirical research, hypothetically-based 
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(such as involving the scenario with which we began this paper, for instance) or otherwise, 
exists regarding views on disclosing the existence of AI to our knowledge.  
 
Looking next to the right not to know, although some authors conceive that this right 
emerges from the interest of autonomy, its connection with autonomy is also disputed. 
Certainly, if a right not to know were assumed to exist as a default position, then this would 
seem to give rise to a paternalistic approach of protecting individuals from knowing 
information even though they have no idea of the information’s existence or its content, which 
would hardly seem to be autonomy-enhancing. However, there appears to be greater synergy 
between a right not to know and autonomy if we focus on the situation where an individual 
expresses a wish not to know in advance. Andorno argues that the right embraces autonomy 
because the decision not to know is made by the patient who has been tested – she exercises a 
‘right to informational self determination’ (Andorno, 2004: 436-437; Strasser, 1986; Knoppers, 
2014). This grounding is strongly disputed by Harris and Keywood (2001: 421), who perceive 
a right not to know as being a claimed right to remain in ignorance. Viewed in this light, they 
argue that ‘where the individual is ignorant of information that bears upon rational life choices 
she is not in a position to be self-governing’.  
 
The crux of the matter for Harris and Keywood appears to be that an individual can only 
make an autonomous decision if they avail themselves of crucial information necessary to make 
rational life-choices for the future. Similarly, Ost has stated that asserting a right not to know 
is ‘misguided rhetoric’ because a decision to refuse to hear information that relates to one’s 
medical condition and treatment is irrational, and ‘irrationality is an autonomy-defeating 
condition’ (Ost, 1984: 304, 306). Whilst we have limited space to critique this position, we 
would question why it should be the case that an individual cannot make an autonomous choice 
to refuse to hear information in order to protect her psychological integrity. Granted, she may 
be depriving herself of knowledge that could alter certain life-choices that she is making which 
she considers to be rational, and some of these choices may be self-defeating (if, say, she is 
only likely to live another five years rather than twenty-five (Harris and Keywood, 2001)). But 
does this fail to satisfy the afore-mentioned definition of autonomy? Can it not be a meaningful 
choice based on sufficient understanding, provided she has taken into account the advantages 
and disadvantages of knowing the results of the genetic test? Why should her choice to remain 
unaware of this information in order to protect her psychological integrity be irrational? And, 
given the potential for serious harm that we go on to discuss, it is even more difficult to argue 
that a knowing AI victim who chooses not to be informed of any new cases involving her AI 
makes an irrational choice. 
 
When it comes to unsolicited disclosures, Laurie has proposed an alternative grounding of 
the right or interest of the person to whom the information relates which could better capture 
the value at stake than autonomy (and we will explore the distinction between ‘right’ and 
‘interest’ in a later section). For, ‘[i]f I do not know that there is something to know, then I 
cannot meaningfully exercise a choice [to know or] not to know’ (Laurie, 2014b: 56; and see 
Andorno, 2004: 437). Returning to and critiquing Husted’s earlier contention, how can an 
unsolicited disclosure cause an infringement of autonomy given that the person informed ‘has 
never exercised their autonomy over the said information’ (Laurie, 2014b: 56)? However, 
whilst it may not be autonomy that is being encroached upon through an unsolicited disclosure, 
a violation could still occur. In our view, this violation relates to the person’s spatial privacy, 




A realm of psychological spatial privacy allows us to create and retain a greater degree of 
control over our own concept of who we are and how we choose to engage with the world… 
Control of information about ourselves must be an essential part of any concept of ourselves 
as autonomous persons… [including] the facility not to accept the information ab initio. A 
concept of “control” which is wide enough to encompass this notion permits us to retain a 
private sphere that is truly our own. Furthermore, it allows us to maintain that unsolicited 
revelations of personal information [are] an invasion of that sphere, even when such 
revelations about ourselves are made to ourselves. (1999: 119, 124) 
 
We contend that invading another’s private sphere through an unsolicited disclosure in this 
way is a morally significant act because it can adversely affect their sense of self. It invades 
the person’s psychological space and removes their ability to reject personal information about 
themselves, information that they have not made any advance autonomous choice about. This 
has significant ramifications for the effectiveness of autonomy as a foundational framework 
for resolving the dilemma in the case of unknowing AI victims, as we go on to discuss. Whilst 
the contention that autonomy does not seem to be the obvious interest at stake might again be 
open to some challenge in light of the findings of the afore-mentioned genetic information 
studies regarding a significant number of participants wishing to know about a treatable or 
avoidable condition, these are only the views of these participants concerning certain 
hypothetical circumstances. In short, absent any meaningful exercise of choice regarding 
whether to be told, an unsolicited disclosure interferes with the individual’s spatial privacy, 
their control of what personal information they choose to know and not to know. It is thus 
noteworthy that a concern about invading unknowing relatives’ privacy in this way through 
disclosure has been expressed by participants in some empirical studies (Dheensa et al., 2016: 
299). And in one study in which the close relatives of confirmed carriers of a heritable mutation 
causing cancer were informed by letter that they were at risk of having the same mutation, 7% 
stated that they did not want further information regarding familial cancer risk, albeit not citing 
their privacy interests specifically (Suthers et al., 2006: 667). 
 
If the basis for a right or interest in not knowing is construed as residing in privacy as 
suggested above, such an analysis can offer a neutral starting point to address disclosure 
dilemmas. This is because entering another’s state of privacy through an unsolicited disclosure 
can sometimes be justified, but, on other occasions, it can constitute ‘unwarranted trespass’ 
(Laurie, 2014b: 59), depending on the factors for and against disclosure in the particular case. 
It is here that the significance of Millian consequentialist considerations becomes apparent 
(Mill, 1993), because a particular factor requiring consideration would be the potential benefit 
or harm that disclosure may cause to the person. 
 
The initial point to consider is that information regarding an unwanted genetic status 
pertaining to a serious, non-treatable/preventable condition and information regarding AI 
images is disruptive. Whilst it may be empowering, enabling self-ownership of significant 
personal information, knowledge of this information potentially alters the person’s sense of 
self in a negative way (Turner, 2009); knowing it is likely to cause distress and harm. 
Unsolicited disclosures invade individuals’ psychological spatial privacy with knowledge that 
could have consequent serious adverse effects upon them. In cases of single gene disorders 
such as Huntington’s, the future of the person whose genetic status is revealed could be set in 
stone in the sense that she will develop condition X and might die as a result, and knowledge 
of the historic abuse and/or the existence and dissemination of images could cause the AI victim 
to experience considerable long-term psychological suffering with no certain end point.7 
Whilst the exact duration and severity of the psychological suffering caused to different AI 
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victims and different individuals whose genetic predisposition to a particular condition is 
revealed could vary, nonetheless it is difficult to conceive of cases where serious psychological 
suffering would not be caused, unless the condition revealed by genetic testing is preventable 
or manageable with treatment. Moreover, once this information is known, neither the individual 
whose genetic status is revealed, nor the AI victim, can do anything about it; whilst both parties 
could receive counselling support to help them find a way to deal with the knowledge, they 
cannot alter the genetic information nor the fact that the abuse and the recording of this abuse 
has occurred. Neither party can ‘unknow’ nor ‘intentionally abandon’ (Turner, 2009: 364) the 
information, and knowing it can be life-changing, albeit that information regarding AI relates 
to the past and genetic information to the future. 
 
There are, however, notable distinctions between the potential effects of disclosure in the 
genetic and AI information contexts. First, in cases where the information pertains to a genetic 
predisposition to a treatable/preventable condition, the disclosure could enable the individual 
to take action to reduce the risk of developing the particular disease, or actually prevent the 
genetic mutation from manifesting; the future harm could be avoided (Laurie, 2004; Takala, 
2001), thereby having a greater positive (preparedness) effect than negative effect. Indeed, the 
empirical studies referred to earlier suggest that where action can be taken to prevent the future 
harm from occurring, this is the strongest factor influencing participants who expressed a wish 
to be informed of unknown genetic information pertaining to a condition that would be 
detrimental to their health (Heaton and Chico, 2016: 114). Thus, whilst disclosing a person’s 
genetic status can, in itself, be harmful if the condition is serious and non-treatable/preventable, 
it can be significantly beneficial where the condition is treatable/preventable – disclosure can 
avoid the harm of the manifestation of the genetic risk. For AI victims, it is difficult to see how 
disclosure could enable any preventative action (since the harm has already occurred) or bring 
about any form of relief. Yet there might be a positive outcome in terms of empowerment, as 
we will discuss in our penultimate section. In both contexts, therefore, an unsolicited disclosure 
of the information could be an incursion into spatial privacy that has beneficial effects which 
could justify the incursion, but these beneficial effects are likely to be very different and of 
differing value.  
 
Secondly, there are distinct differences regarding the psychological and relational 
ramifications of disclosure. Research demonstrates that child sexual abuse victims suffer 
enduring physical and mental harm (Finkelhor, 1984), and the existence of an AI can serve ‘to 
perpetuate the images and the memory of [the] abuse’ (Taylor and Quayle, 2003: 24). AI 
available online can feature abuse involving a child performing sexual acts upon adults or other 
children, adults having sexual intercourse with the child, and abuse that is even more severe, 
including bestiality, torture and degrading acts (Taylor and Quayle, 2003: 32). It should 
therefore be unsurprising that AI victims suffer ‘from feelings of shame, hate and disgust or 
loathing’, and have a ‘higher susceptibility to post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and 
psychoses’ (von Weiler et al., 2010: 214, 217). In short, ‘the existence of abusive images 
always [leads] to additional psychological stress’ (von Weiler et al., 2010: 216; Gewirtz-
Meydan et al., 2018). And where the abuser and creator of the AI is a family member, as is 
commonly the case (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2018: 242), abuse may be a long-held family 
secret. Disclosure of this abuse and the existence of AI will have huge, negative consequences, 
potentially for all family members. Furthermore, some relatives may take sides with the abuser, 
with the consequence that the family is torn apart (Münzer et al., 2016). In contrast, a person 
who learns of genetic information with serious implications for her health may turn to her 
family for support, albeit that the existence of such information can also be divisive and cause 
other family members to suffer mental harm (Dheensa et al., 2016: 298; Gargiulo et al., 2009). 
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Awareness of the information, especially where the condition is fatal and non-
treatable/preventable, is likely to cause serious mental distress, anxiety and depression, but is 
unlikely to give rise to any feelings of guilt or shame. 
 
Thirdly, in genetic testing, the harm of the manifestation of the genetic risk either might, or 
will, befall the individual whether or not they are notified in advance of their genetic status. In 
contrast, for unaware AI victims, it is the notification itself that creates the likely harm.8 We 
accept that for V1 and V2, their awareness of the existence of photographs of their abuse may 
mean that they have an awareness of a risk that these images could be found in the possession 
of others, but the certainty of this is only confirmed by the disclosure, which is thereby apt to 
generate the harm. Thirdly, the knowledge that comes with disclosure in the AI context is black 
and white – the abuse has occurred, and photographs exist and have been distributed.  In many 
genetic status cases, however, the knowledge will not be as precise. Other than in single gene 
inherited disorders such as Huntingdon’s or cystic fibrosis, there is likely to be a percentage 
consideration to weigh up (Heaton and Chico, 2016); whilst it may be that an inherited gene 
sequence increases the chance of acquiring a particular condition, whether or not the individual 
goes on to develop the disease is not certain and depends on a complex group of factors 
occurring, of which genes are just one component.  
 
The similarities and distinctions between the genetic and AI information contexts resonate. 
Both disclosure contexts involve differing levels of knowledge, the real risk of harm, and the 
inability to unknow disruptive information that give rise to morally significant autonomy and 
spatial privacy concerns. The distinctions, particularly the lack of any positive harm-avoiding 
effects of disclosure for AI victims, provide strong prima facie grounds to suggest that a 
careful, precautionary approach should be taken to the matter of whether to disclose the 
existence of images to AI victims. However, before exploring this further, the next question to 
be addressed is whether a victim’s lack of knowledge of the existence and/or distribution of AI 




The dilemma of respecting AI victims’ ‘rights’ without one thwarting the other  
 
The significant matter that we have alluded to concerning foreknowledge of the information’s 
existence means that whilst there is usually no conflict between the rights to know and not to 
know for the person who has undergone genetic testing, and this could also be true for AI V1, 
there is a substantive conflict between these putative rights for unaware relatives in the genetic 
context and AI Vs2-4. The person who has undergone genetic testing is already aware there is 
sensitive information about herself that she may or may not wish to know. Taking into account 
the reasons in favour of knowing and against knowing, she can then exercise her autonomy in 
deciding whether or not to know the results. Similarly, because she is aware of the existence 
of AI and their accessibility to others, the same is true for V1 provided that she has been given 
the opportunity to decide whether or not she wishes to be informed of future cases involving 
her images. She can make an autonomous decision, informed by her past experiences and 
awareness of the earlier crimes. If V1 has not been presented with the opportunity to make this 
advance decision, however, we are faced with the same problem that we will now discuss 
regarding relatives who are unaware of the genetic tests and AI Vs2-4. 
 
Unaware relatives cannot make an autonomous decision to know or not to know the results 
of the test without first being informed that their relative has been tested. Likewise, Vs2-4 have 
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no knowledge that information exists concerning crimes committed against them (that is, 
crimes related to distribution and accessing images for V2, and crimes related to abuse, 
creation, distribution and accessing of the AI for Vs3 and 4). They are, therefore, unable to 
exercise their autonomy and weigh up the reasons for and against knowing this information 
without first being informed of its existence by LEAs. Thus, in order to exercise a right to 
know, Vs2-4 need to be told that information is available about themselves and it is difficult to 
envisage how they could be alerted to this information’s existence without its essence being 
revealed and, thereby, their right not to know being thwarted.  
 
Revealing the essence of the information might be avoided in the case of unaware relatives 
in the genetic context. They could, for instance, be informed that there is certain genetic 
information which may impact upon their health without the specifics of this information being 
disclosed, and then take the decision as to whether they wish to know more, thereby enabling 
them to take preventative measures where possible (Suthers et al., 2006: 670). Likewise, a 
similar means of disclosing partial facts to AI Vs2-3 could be conceived of; they might be told 
that further information is available pertaining to sexual abuse crimes committed against them 
and this would not, in itself, reveal the essence of this information. However, this is arguably 
tantamount to knowing; if we take seriously the right in not knowing, then this right might be 
encroached upon if victims are made to know something at all.9 And disclosure of such a vague 
statement could still lead to Vs2-3 guessing the nature of information, without having any 
similar opportunities available to enable them to avoid harm.  
 
What is more, it is even harder to see how the information’s existence could be disclosed 
without revealing its essence for V1 (where she has not been given an opportunity to decide 
whether or not she wishes to be informed of future cases involving her AI) and V4. V1’s pre-
existing knowledge of the existence and distribution of the AI means that it is highly likely that 
she will realise that the ‘further information’ concerns other crimes related to these images. V4 
knows nothing of the abuse or the existence of the AI and so any disclosure would have to be 
couched in extremely vague terms (such as ‘there is certain information and evidence relating 
to crimes committed against you when you were a young child’), so as to avoid any revelation 
as to the nature of the crimes committed. Such a nebulous disclosure would preclude any 
meaningful exercise of V4’s autonomy in deciding whether she wishes to know or not to know 
this information. Giving V4 the information required to enable her to exercise her right to know 
is far more likely to defeat her right not to know, thereby thwarting her ability to reject personal 
information about herself.  
 
If, however, LEAs conclude that keeping AI victims in the dark is the only way to avoid 
any risk of disclosing the essence of the information to them, they deny them the right to know 
the information. How, then, are the rights to know and not to know to be reconciled? In order 
to answer this question, we may have to move away from the language of rights. 
 
 
Rights or interests? 
 
The language of rights is often used as convenient shorthand when it comes to matters relating 
to standards of human behaviour towards others and the protection that should be afforded to 
the fundamental rights of all human beings. The matters at stake in the dilemma that concerns 
this paper would, at first blush, appear to be appropriately conceptualised as rights-based since 
they relate to the way in which LEAs should act towards victims of crime and information that 
is fundamentally private and personal (despite being related to criminal activity). But it is 
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necessary to take a step back and assess whether it is in fact helpful to conceptualise this 
disclosure dilemma as one involving rights, or whether it is actually more fruitful to 
conceptualise the issue in terms of interests. 
 
Although it may be controversial to go so far as to argue that rights are derived from moral 
principles and are ends in themselves (but see Peerenboom, 1995, 361-362), rights commonly 
reflect fundamental values and command a prima facie ground for respect (Dworkin, 1984). In 
contrast, whilst interests can be conceptualised as ‘the anchor of rights’ (Scanlon, 2009: 76), 
whether an individual’s particular interest should be protected depends upon consequential 
considerations and the balancing of this interest against any competing interests (Scanlon, 
2009: 78). And notably, whilst the onus is placed on those who would impinge on a right to 
justify this in the strongest terms and by the least impactful means, there are no prima facie 
duties as such – or at least there are softer obligations - to pay due recognition to interests in 
weighing up what ought to be done.10  
Recognition of rights in law has particular advantages for their protection, because the law 
can impose a duty to respect the right in question and demand a remedy on its violation. The 
conceptualisation of the disclosure issue as involving rights in the genetic information debate 
is understandable given the dominance of patient autonomy and rights in the contemporary 
professional, ethical and legal models of health care. Notably, in a broader health care context, 
the right to know has been given legal authority through the now recognised prudent patient 
test: the patient has a right to know material information necessary to make an informed 
decision regarding their health care. The doctor’s duty to respect this right is recognised, and 
dereliction of this duty that causes harm is actionable through the tort of negligence.11 Or more 
specific pertinence, the potential application of human rights law to genetic information offers 
some interesting insight into how law could come into play in disclosure contexts. A right to 
know the result of genetic screening pertaining to one’s own health could be claimed under 
Article 8 (which protects private and family life and autonomy12) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). Gilbar and Foster (2016: 121) have argued that this would be 
framed as concerning ‘fundamental rights (to know about one’s own genetic constitution and 
to make informed decisions about medical care)’.13 Although there is no recognition of a right 
not to know in domestic law (Laurie, 2014b: 59), it has been accepted that doctors are not 
obligated to provide patients with information that they do not desire to know.14 A right not to 
know genetic information pertaining to oneself is protected in two international instruments, 
however, neither is legally binding on the UK.15 Whilst conceptualising the right not to know 
as being based on an individual’s interest in spatial privacy might also mean that it could be 
encompassed by Article 8 (Laurie, 2014a: 42), in the limited circumstances in which doctors 
can withhold information from their patients within this jurisdiction, this has not been 
legitimated on the basis of any such right. Rather, it is the doctor’s therapeutic privilege that 
has been cited, a privilege which entitles the doctor not to disclose certain information because 
she considers this to be objectively in the patient’s best interests, since disclosure would be 
detrimental to the patient’s health.16 It thus appears that the law indirectly recognises an interest 
in not knowing rather than a right, albeit in very limited circumstances (Jackson, 2016: 212). 
For reasons that we will now begin to tease out, we would argue that, with one exception, 
interests offer a more constructive framing for the AI context.   
The first note of caution to be expressed when considering whether a rights-based 
conceptualisation is appropriate for our particular disclosure dilemma is that a rights discourse 
may have a tendency to make conflicts seem more intractable. As both are prima facie 
entitlements of the same level, it might be assumed that neither the AI victim’s right to know 
nor her right not to know should trump the other, creating an impasse. However, it would be 
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inaccurate to perceive rights as being necessarily absolute, or to contend that conflicts between 
rights cannot be resolved. Jurisprudence on settling conflict between Article 8 and 10 (privacy 
versus freedom of expression) under the ECHR,17 for example, illustrates that legal solutions 
involving the balancing - or redefining (Scanlon, 2009: 76-78) - of rights can be found. Indeed, 
if it is accepted that conduct involving a decision to disclose or not disclose information to an 
individual engages Article 8, Article 8(2) offers a means of finding a balance between 
conflicting rights. It requires: a pressing need; justification of the necessity of the interference; 
and proportionate conduct. A rights-based conceptualisation could then offer a means of 
resolving the dilemma through an assessment of these factors, suggesting that an objection to 
a rights-based conceptualisation grounded on the intractability of rights can be contested.  
When it comes to balancing the AI victim’s right to know and her right not to know, 
however, a particular difficulty is that the rights in question would be possessed by the one 
victim, rather than this being a case of balancing the conflicting rights of two or more 
individuals.18 It is hard to envisage how, practically, the rights could be balanced when 
exercising one effectively cancels out the other. Moreover, as already noted, rights impose 
duties (Halpin, 1997: 30 and 261; Scanlon, 2009: 69-70 and 75). This problematises the AI 
disclose dilemma further, because we must then conceive not only of victims’ rights to know 
and not to know, but also of duties to inform and not to inform which would obligate LEAs. 
The existence of these additional conflicting duties would only add further complications.  
A further reason for a cautious assessment of the suitability of a rights discourse relates to 
this discourse’s dependency on a landscape that is amenable to it, such as is apparent within 
health care law. Is a growing recognition of rights also apparent in criminal justice? We can 
look to the push for greater victim involvement in the criminal justice process (Dignan, 2005: 
chapter 3), the greatest effect of which is seen in the paramountcy of victims’ rights in the 
United States since the emergence of the victims’ rights movement in the 1970s (Ginsberg, 
2014), and calls from academics based in the UK from the 1980s onwards for turning away 
from victims’ needs to a rights-based approach (Mawby and Walklate, 1995; Mawby and Gil, 
1987). We note also the significance of human rights for radical victimology (Kauzlarich et al., 
2001). However, more specifically, whilst current policy in the UK recognises ‘rights’ 
(Walklate, 2007: 108) related to the bestowal of information under the Code of Practice for 
Victims of Crime (Ministry of Justice, 2015), these rights only apply after the victim has 
reported a crime. And they pertain to the progress of that particular crime and offender through 
the criminal justice system (see, e.g., Newton, 2003 and European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union (2012): Articles 4 and 6). These rights, and academic calls for victims’ 
rights including a right to knowledge (Mawby and Gill, 1987: 229), do not relate to a context 
in which LEAs have information regarding a crime of which a victim remains unaware.  
 
Whilst there may be a case for advocating disclosure rights for unknowing crime victims, 
in the current absence of such a call, conceiving of such rights (and the accompanying 
conflicting duties that they could place on LEAs) seems premature. That said, we adopt a 
different position where the ‘knowing’ V1 has expressed a prior wish to know or not to know 
regarding future disclosures and this wish is ignored, since it is in her case that a rights-based 
claim could most persuasively be made.19 As we argue in the next section, this exercise of her 
autonomy regarding private information about herself may well bring Article 8 rights under 
the ECHR into play, meaning that a right to know or not to know is offered legal recognition 
and protection. Moreover, there is no conflict between the right to know and not to know for 




We suggest that the existence of rights to know and not to know is less likely to be accepted 
for unknowing Vs1-4 given the absence of any exercise of autonomy regarding future 
disclosures that could give rise to a duty on part of LEAs to resolve the conflict between these 
rights one way or the other. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to conceptualise the issue 
as one involving unknowing victims’ interests. We recognise that utilising a different construct 
would not remove the conflict identified earlier; providing the unknowing AI victim with 
information to serve her interest in knowing would still frustrate her interest in not knowing. 
However, an interests-based framework would remove the potential added complication of 
creating conflicting duties on the part of LEAs. A resolution to the conflict between the interests 
could be achieved by achieving a balance between them. The starting point would be to 
recognise that they have equal significance given their connection to the same value enshrined 
in Article 8 of the ECHR of respecting private and family life. How they are to be balanced 
depends upon the particular circumstances and issues at stake, so that one interest might 
outweigh the other in certain circumstances. And even though we have rejected a rights-based 
conceptualisation for unknowing victims, the criteria under Article 8(2) can still assist in this 
endeavour. It is thus necessary to consider the rationales for and against knowing, and their 
respective weights, so that these can then be situated within the facts of the particular case. 
 
 
Should LEAs step into the AI victim’s private sphere? 
 
Returning to Laurie’s conceptualisation of privacy as the foundation for the interests at stake 
in the disclosure dilemma, entering another’s state of privacy can sometimes be justified, but 
it can also constitute ‘unwarranted trespass’ (Laurie, 2014b: 59). Which of these two categories 
disclosing the information about the crimes committed against the AI victim falls into depends 
on the reasons for and against stepping into her private sphere (such as whether the disclosure 
is deemed necessary and whether there is a pressing need for it), and the consequences of 
disclosure. These are matters which we will now identify and reflect upon.  
 
Arguments supporting the disclosure of the information concerning AI: the victim’s 
interest in knowing 
 
For all AI victims, their interest in knowing can be based on notions of self-authorship of their 
life and experiences (Wilson, 2015: 214-215). For V1, if this issue has been discussed with her 
previously and she has expressed a wish to know of future cases involving her AI, it would 
amount to a clear violation of her autonomy not to disclose. It would be inappropriate to 
consider disclosure in these circumstances to be an encroachment into her spatial privacy. 
Rather, it is an approach that V1 has requested as part of her exercising control over information 
about herself. This could lead to a claimed right under Article 8; a potential duty to disclose 
could be argued to arise following V1’s exercise of autonomy and request to be informed.20 It 
is unlikely that LEAs could rely on Article 8(2) to justify any failure to disclose on the basis of 
non-disclosure being necessary and there being a pressing need to interfere with the victim’s 
right, unless there is a serious mental health concern and the victim is considered vulnerable, 
or her capacity to make an autonomous choice when she made her previous decision to know 
is brought into doubt.   
 
Notably, a right to be informed for victims who are aware of the existence of AI is recognised 
through the federal Victim Notification System in the United States; victims can ask to be 
notified whenever an image of them is connected to a criminal prosecution and this gives rise 
to the possibility of seeking reparation (Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771; 
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Ost, 2016: 229-632). We recognise that repeated notifications may well increase V1’s 
psychological suffering, serving as a constant reminder of the abuse. For example, one victim 
in the U.S. whose lawyer receives notification whenever her images appear in a new case has 
stated that receiving these notices ‘in itself is traumatizing’ (Laird, 2012). However, the 
knowing V1 should be able to exercise her autonomy and make the decision that, 
notwithstanding this risk of further traumatisation, she would still wish to be informed in future 
cases. She may weigh this risk against the possibility of seeking reparation and restorative 
justice by way of an apology from the offender (Ost, 2016; Tavuchis, 1991). Thus, a positive 
consequence of disclosure is one of empowerment; it enables the victim to avail herself of the 
opportunity to bring the offender to account to her personally and may also validate her 
recollection of the crimes committed against her (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2018: 245). The 
knowing victim’s interest in autonomy is thus compatible with, and conducive to, 
empowerment here, in that respecting the knowing victim’s autonomy facilitates her 
empowerment. Whilst we would accept that obtaining reparation for crimes related to accessing 
AI under the current law in this jurisdiction is not straightforward, the civil law could offer a 
route to obtaining compensation from abusers and those who create and distribute AI (Ost, 
2016). Ignoring this request to be informed of future cases would deny VI the empowerment 
that she seeks and could thereby reinforce her victim status (Van Dijk, 1985). 
We should sound a note of caution about respecting the knowing V1’s autonomy, however. 
It might be contended that it would impossible for the knowing V1 to make a truly informed 
decision that she wishes to know in future cases. This is because LEAs cannot predict how 
many future cases will arise involving distribution or possession of her AI. One possibility is 
that very few future cases arise. At the other end of the scale, V1’s images may be circulated 
widely and found on a large number of computers that are seized in AI cases, so that V1 is 
reminded repeatedly of the harm done to her and frequently re-victimised.21 The psychological 
impact of being informed could well differ significantly depending on which scenario 
materialises. We accept that the uncertainty surrounding the frequency at which future cases 
will occur means that, when V1 exercises her autonomy and chooses to be informed in the 
future, she cannot make this decision in the knowledge of how often she will be contacted by 
LEAs. However, provided this is made clear to her when she is given the opportunity to express 
a wish to know in future cases, and she is given sufficient time to deliberate on this and discuss 
it with a counsellor, she should be able to give ‘effectively informed’ (Laurie, 2014b: 54) 
consent to being told of future cases. Moreover, she could be given the opportunity to re-
consider her decision when she is informed of future cases, to help ensure the 
contemporaneousness of her views. And on each occasion of being informed anew, she could 
exercise her autonomy to refuse any future and further approaches; opt-out would always be 
an option. 
What about unknowing victims? Returning to the definition of autonomy cited earlier 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013: 101), failing to inform unaware victims arguably impacts 
upon their autonomy in that the deprivation of this information causes their own understanding 
of their life experiences to be inadequate, or at the very least incomplete, thereby preventing 
meaningful choice. It might be contended further that it is overly paternalistic not to inform. 
Whilst a paternalistic approach may be appropriate in cases involving children, it could be 
argued that claiming that there is a necessary interference with the interest in knowing in order 
to protect the now-adult victim from being told information that could distress her would not 
legitimate a non-disclosure decision. The autonomy-based claim for disclosure could thereby 
maintain that LEAs can legitimately enter the AI victim’s private sphere and, indeed, that they 
have a disclosure responsibility to empower the victim to take control over this previously 
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unknown life experience, opening up the meaningful choice to her of taking possible action to 
bring the offender to account to her personally for the wrong and harm that he has perpetrated.  
 
However, there are reasons to be cautious about assuming that autonomy goes hand in hand 
with, and supports, disclosure to unknowing victims. Referring back to Husted’s and Laurie’s 
analyses, disclosure of crimes committed against them is not necessarily going to support the 
autonomy of Vs2-4, or V1 if she has not previously stated whether or not she would wish to 
know in future cases; Vs2-4 have not exercised any autonomy over the information and we do 
not know whether disclosure would infringe or enhance V1’s autonomy. For where LEAs have 
information in the absence of the victim’s exercise of autonomy, their unsolicited approach 
would presumably be premised on some sense of an obligation to enhance the victim’s 
autonomy, with a view to empowering her. But what would the basis of such an obligation be? 
It is speculative, potentially harmful, and could have the effect of being autonomy-reducing in 
the future, as we discuss shortly.  
In sum, there is a clear autonomy-based argument for informing the knowing V1 who wishes 
to know that is bolstered by the empowerment that this desired disclosure will facilitate. There 
is a possible autonomy-based argument for unknowing Vs1-4 that might justify the invasion of 
their spatial privacy, which is again connected to empowerment. All AI victims may have an 
empowerment interest in knowing because of the possibility of seeking reparation which being 
armed with knowledge of offences might give rise to, and the way in which the existence of AI 
might validate their experiences. But this is far less persuasive because we do not actually know 
whether failing to inform would infringe the victims’ autonomy given that we cannot ascertain 
what they would have decided. In our view, absent any prior expressed wish, the victim's 
interest in spatial privacy trumps her interest in empowerment because of the likelihood of 
serious harm that disclosure would cause, which we will now discuss. 
 
 
Arguments against disclosing the existence of photographs: the interest in not knowing 
 
All AI victims have an interest in not knowing predicated on the potentially harmful 
consequences of disclosure. For V4, the consequences of disclosing her abuse and the existence 
of AI is extremely likely to cause very serious distress and psychological harm, even if dealt 
with sensitively by LEAs (and see Taylor and Quayle, 2003: 206-207). It is also highly 
probable that disclosure will cause grave distress to V3, as she will now know that there exists 
a photographic record of abuse which could perpetuate the memory of the abuse and exacerbate 
her psychological suffering. We have already noted the feelings of shame, hate etc that AI 
victims experience (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2018: 243; von Weiler et al., 2010). Moreover, if 
the information pertains to the distribution of the AI, then V3 may fear that there will be no 
closure (Leonard, 2010: 252; von Weiler et al., 2010: 216). ‘… [V]ictims who know, or become 
aware, that images of their sexual abuse are circulating online must live throughout their lives 
with the knowledge that these images may exist in cyberspace forever’ and ‘[t]he trauma of 
such disclosure should never be underestimated’ (Martin, 2015: 277; Palmer, 2005: 65; and see 
von Weiler et al., 2010). Similarly, for V2, whilst she was aware of the existence of the AI, the 
new knowledge that these images have been distributed to and accessed by others is likely to 
cause her additional mental harm and there is the same risk of there being no end point to this. 
Thus, there are good reasons to suggest that Vs2-4 have a significant interest in not knowing 
this information in order to avoid the harm this knowledge will cause. Indeed, it is notable that, 
albeit in the context of victims who are still children, some therapists have cautioned against 
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ever informing unaware victims of the availability of their AI to others since this would prevent 
their rehabilitation (Carr, 2001).  
 
For V1, disclosure could exacerbate the psychological harm she already suffers, affirming 
her fear that she will never have any closure because the images are ‘out there’.  We would, 
therefore, challenge the (ostensibly) autonomy-based argument noted in the sub-section above 
that protecting the now-adult victim from being told information which could distress her could 
not constitute a necessary interference with the interest in knowing; the findings of these studies 
offer persuasive grounds for protecting unknowing victims from this damaging information. 
Indeed, it would violate V1’s autonomy to disclose the discovery of her images in a new case 
if she has previously expressed a view that she would not wish to know about future offences 
related to the accessing of the AI (Laurie, 2014a: 42). A disclosure in these circumstances could 
lead to the victim’s secondary victimisation (Frazier and Haney, 1996; Aviv and Weisburd, 
2016), which EU Member States have a duty to protect victims against (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union (2012): Article 18). Moreover, V1 could claim a right not 
to know under Article 8: if LEAs do disclose the information to her and she consequently 
suffers harm, she could potentially base her claim on: spatial privacy22; the right to retain 
control over her own experiences (Taylor and Quayle, 2003: 206); and a right to be protected 
from harm (X and Y v Netherlands) through unwanted disclosure. LEAs are unlikely to be able 
to justify their interference with V1’s right not to know under Article 8(2) through claiming 
that there is a pressing need to empower her, since any legal prospect of bringing offenders to 
account through reparation and restorative justice is not assured (Ost, 2016).  
 
Given the real risk of serious harm to all AI victims, informing them of the existence of this 
sensitive information about them is an incursion into their spatial privacy which should be 
avoided in any case other than that involving the knowing V1 who has expressed a prior wish 
to know. There is something of a parallel here with the afore-mentioned doctor’s therapeutic 
privilege in the health care context, with the basis of the principle underlying this privilege 
being to avoid causing harm to the patient. A further argument against disclosure can be based 
on the danger that disclosing the information pertaining to AI might restrict unknowing 
victims’ future life-choices. This is because they may make ‘morally forced choices’ as a 
consequence of this knowledge or, to put it another way, knowing the information may well 
‘alter [their] imagined tomorrows’ (Turner, 2009: 337). They could, for instance feel unable to 
commit to a deep emotional involvement with a partner because of their mental suffering 
(Husted, 2014: 34-35). However, we should remember that this may not be easily 
conceptualised as an infringement of autonomy because unaware victims have not exercised 
any meaningful choice over information unknown to them. Rather, it is a trespass into spatial 
privacy that is likely to cause serious harm, and which cannot be justified by claiming that 
LEAs sought to enhance the victim’s autonomy. 
 
We should also consider that if a victim is informed of the existence of AI, there may not 
be the appropriate level of counselling in place to support her. Treatment and therapy for AI 
victims is currently limited and there is a real need for better investment in training for 
counselling practitioners (Martin, 2016: 374; British Association of Social Workers, 2013). 
Studies have revealed that therapists working with child sexual abuse victims ‘are still at a loss 
as to how to treat [AI victims] to the fullest extent’ (von Weiler et al. 2010: 221; and see Martin, 
2014). Taken with the above concerns, this provides a powerful case for protecting victims’ 
interests in not knowing for all but the knowing V1 who has expressed a prior wish to know. 
This is especially so given the earlier observations that disclosure is likely to create a harm that 
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may otherwise not have occurred and would then need to be addressed, and which cannot be 
reversed (Keren-Paz, 2017: 424).  
 
In concluding this section, we note that although our analysis is set within a framework of 
victims’ autonomy and spatial privacy, and part of it is informed by studies involving AI 
victims and their therapists, nonetheless, it reflects a degree of paternalism (and see Laurie, 
2004: 440). On the basis of our analysis we are stating what we consider to be best for AI 
victims, we are setting out what we perceive their interests to be, and the best way to resolve 
the disclosure dilemma; in other words, we are making assumptions that may not reflect the 
‘actual lived experiences’ of AI victims (Walklate, 2016: 11). However, in our view, this form 
of modified paternalism offers the most appropriate way forward because, for reasons already 
discussed, it is difficult to envisage how LEAs could enable victims to make the disclosure 
decision without revealing the essence of the information and defeating their interest in not 
knowing, thereby creating the grave, real risk of harm identified in this sub-section. Moreover, 
any potentially legitimating factor of enabling harm-preventing action that can exist in the 
genetic information disclosure context would be absent. Employing the language of Article 
8(2), it is seemingly not possible for LEAs to engage in proportionate conduct by only 
disclosing details that do not reveal the essence of the information and, even if this could be 




Conclusions: to know or not to know? The way forward and the implications for 
victimology 
 
Our concern with unknowing AI victims in this paper has involved traversing unchartered 
territory for victimology. Exploring the parallels and disconnects with the debate regarding 
knowing and not knowing genetic information has revealed that conceptualising the disclosure 
dilemma as one involving rights to know and not to know is only appropriate for the knowing 
AI V1 who has expressed a prior wish regarding the issue. In her case, failing to respect her 
autonomy could well engage her right under Article 8 of the ECHR and it is highly unlikely 
that interference with this right could be justified on the basis of necessity or any pressing need. 
In all other cases involving unaware victims, the absence of any exercise of autonomy 
regarding future disclosures that could impose a duty upon LEAs to resolve the disclosure 
dilemma one way or the other, means that there is an intractable conflict between purported 
rights to know and not to know. What is more, unlike the knowing V1 - who has effectively 
consented to and accepted the risk and burden of potential harm that knowledge brings with it 
– we would be imposing a right on an unknowing victim that might empower her but could 
(and in all likelihood will) cause her to suffer harmful effects. And we would be placing a 
serious burden upon LEAs to respect a right that we do not know the unknowing victim would 
want. This leads to the conclusion that the matter should be framed as one involving unknowing 
victims’ interests in knowing and not knowing, which we have argued are grounded primarily 
in spatial privacy; AI victims’ spatial privacy would always be violated by unsolicited 
disclosures since revealing the existence of the information affects their control of personal 
information, taking away their facility not to accept information about themselves.  In contrast, 
the existence of autonomy-based foundations for these interests is more contentious, because 
unknowing victims cannot exercise any meaningful choice regarding information that they are 




Deciding whether the interest in knowing or not knowing should prevail is a challenging 
task. Herring and Foster (2012: 26) have contended that in disclosure dilemmas where we do 
not know whether the individual would wish to know the information in question, the starting 
point should be one of not informing. This mirrors Laurie’s (2004: 440) view that ‘[t]he 
presumption [should be] that individuals’ psychological privacy should be respected unless 
there is good reason not to do so.’ As in the genetic context, there can be positive (albeit 
different) reasons for knowing the information in question, but in the AI context, disclosing the 
information is likely to make the unaware victim worse off overall. Arguments against 
disclosing on the basis of the invasion of spatial privacy and the high risk of consequent 
psychological harm that this is likely to cause victims outweigh arguments in favour of 
disclosure, such as empowering victims to seek reparation from offenders. In short, the burden 
of the disclosed information is greater than any potential empowerment it may provide. We are 
thereby advocating a form of modified paternalism regarding any now-adult victims of historic 
child sexual abuse and AI, given the probable, seriously harmful effects of an unsolicited 
disclosure. The exception to such an approach occurs in the case of the knowing V1 who has 
expressed a prior wish to be informed of future offences, since it is her autonomous choice to 
accept the risk of harm that knowing brings. That said, we noted in the introduction that LEAs 
are unlikely to be able to ascertain which victim (1-4) they are faced with, unless she has 
previously been identified and they are aware of the degree of her knowledge. Given the 
rationale behind the precautionary approach that we are advocating, we suggest that LEAs 
work on the assumption that the victim in question does not know that the AI exist and have 
been distributed unless and until this assumption is disproved. 
 
To avoid disclosure dilemmas in the future where victims are aware of images and their 
distribution, it should be ensured that LEAs provide them with the opportunity to make a 
‘timely and effectively-informed’ (Laurie, 2014b: 54) decision to be told or not to be told about 
any subsequent offences involving the AI with the support of a counsellor. A further way of 
reducing future disclosure dilemmas in the case of known victims of child sexual abuse is for 
the possible existence of AI to be discussed sensitively with them during counselling/therapy 
sessions. Such discussions could reveal whether or not victims are aware of AI. Where no AI 
are known to exist, victims could be asked whether they would wish to be informed in the 
future if such images do come to light, and then supported through the process of making a 
meaningful decision on this. More problematic cases would be those in which counsellors are 
aware that AI exist but do not know whether the victim is cognisant of this, returning us to the 
same disclosure dilemma that has been the focus of this paper.  
 
We have offered an ethical exploration of the issues that require consideration and suggested 
a way forward so that police policy can offer some means to resolve the conflict between AI 
victims’ interests in knowing and in not knowing. However, in order to provide a fully-rounded 
answer to the immensely difficult question of whether it is appropriate to disclose, and the best 
way to do so, there is a need for further empirical research exploring practitioners’ and victims’ 
views to take forward this theoretical analysis. These voices offer a vitally important and 
necessary means of testing our conclusion that an approach based on modified paternalism is 
the most appropriate way forward in the case of unaware victims. Moreover, the involvement 
of victims would reduce the more paternalistic elements of our approach in this paper. 
However, in highlighting the need for such research, we must be wary of ‘trauma creep’ and 
of making generalisations regarding what victims’ autonomous views would be: it should not 
be assumed from the findings of any future study involving the experiences of some AI victims 
that the actual lived experiences and views of the collective of AI victims will be the same (see 




Beyond our specific context, the analysis has broader implications for victimology. It has 
opened the door for the introduction of a new paradigm of the unknowing crime victim into 
victimology. We invite others to develop this victim typology and address questions such as 
the following: how should the parameters of this victim classification be defined? How would 
unknowing victims’ interests and needs be best met? Are members of certain groups in society 
more susceptible to becoming or being unknowing victims (see generally Walklate, 2007: 33-
56)? In particular, should a right to know or not to know information about a crime committed 
against them exist for unknowing victims? Whilst we have focused upon Article 8 of the 
ECHR, a more radical move would be to offer a guaranteed right to be notified for unaware 
victims under the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime and to bolster this right, and the other 
rights laid out in this Code, with the force of a statutory law as in the US. Our analysis suggests 
that such an approach should be considered with caution because of the duty it would impose 
upon LEAs to disclose; is it safe to assume that unknowing crime victims would always wish 
to know of a crime committed against them? A right not to know might also be protected under 
the same statutory law, but presumably this could only come into play if victims had expressed 
a wish not to know in advance. Where such a wish has not been expressed, we have 
demonstrated that there may well be an interest in not knowing that would be defeated as soon 
as the duty to inform imposed by a right to know is acted upon. 
 
Consideration should also be paid to why we might seek to disclose to other unaware victims 
that a crime has been committed against them; what purposes would disclosure serve? Factors 
against and in favour of disclosure will, of course, differ depending on the crime. For instance, 
the nature of the crime could have serious implications for a victim who was raped whilst 
unconscious (including the possibility that she may have contracted a sexually transmitted 
disease), making the case for disclosure strong, notwithstanding the undoubtable psychological 
harm that invading her spatial privacy will cause. The rape victim could also claim 
compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, or possibly from the offender 
in a civil case. In contrast, consider the implications for an unaware victim of voyeurism who 
features in a video that the offender has created which has not been distributed and has been 
destroyed. Informing him of the crime committed against him would be likely to cause at least 
some level of mental distress and it is difficult to envisage what interests disclosure would 
serve. Would his understanding of his life experience be inadequate without this information? 
We very much doubt it. And there would be little likelihood of any form of compensation. The 
arguments in favour of non-disclosure and protecting the victim’s spatial privacy would appear 
much stronger in this case.  
 
Finally, would the existence of this new paradigm challenge more conventional conceptions 
based on deeply rooted assumptions (see generally Walklate, 1989: xiv; Walklate, 2007: 28) 
that a person has to suffer harm in order to be considered a victim of crime?23 This is especially 
pertinent, and challenging, given recent work demonstrating the connection between 
conceptions of the crime victim and trauma (McGarry and Walklate, 2015). Whilst seemingly 
at odds with contemporary criminal justice policy permeated by trauma narrative (McGarry 
and Walklate, 2015), we suggest that it is necessary to consider whether there is a need for a 
broader conception of a victim encompassing an individual who has not yet been harmed and 
thus does not realise that they have been victimised. Nonetheless, they have been wronged 
(Feinberg, 1984: 34-35) by a violation of their rights or interests and are highly likely to suffer 






1 Limited resources have meant that having a specific team, or even one law enforcement agent (LEA) dedicated 
to AI victim identification, has been the exception to the norm across police forces in the United Kingdom (see 
the responses to Freedom of Information requests made in 2013 at 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/user/sandra_lavilla?page=1). 
2 In such cases, ‘the general practice would be to attempt to trace the child and, if successful, to explain why 
[LEAs] are needing to speak to the victim - amongst some of the reasons would be to ensure the child is safe, 
discover more about the perpetrator if not known to the police, ascertain whether other children are at risk/have 
been subjected to CAI etc’. Personal correspondence with Tink Palmer, Chief Executive of the Marie Collins 
Foundation, on file with authors.  
3 Whilst we recognise that AI victims are both male and female, for reasons of brevity, we use the pronoun ‘she’ 
when referring to the AI victim in this paper.  
4 There is reference in the literature to some victims of white collar crime remaining unaware victims, but this is 
usually noted in order to explain why such crime is under-reported (Goodey, 2005: 241; Walklate, 1989, chapter 
4; Box, 1983: 17).   
5 We acknowledge the existence of a debate concerning a child’s right to know his or her genetic parentage too, 
but do not see this debate to be as apposite as that in the HCE&L literature because it is only recently that the 
issue of a right not to know has started to be explored within it (Herring and Foster, 2012). 
6 A hereditary neurodegenerative disorder for which there is currently no cure. ‘Survival from onset to death 
averages 17–20 years… The characteristic symptoms of HD are [involuntary muscular] movements, cognitive 
impairment, mood disorders, and behavioral changes that are chronic and progressive over the course of the 
illness.’ (Myers, 2004: 255). 
7 As we discuss later in our penultimate section. 
8 We are grateful to Tsachi Keren-Paz for this observation. 
9 Our thanks to Graeme Laurie for this point. 
10 We are grateful to Graeme Laurie for this observation. 
11 See Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 
(confirming the dissenting judgment of Lord Scarman in Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 
AC 871).  
12 See Pretty v. UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1; Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22, para 50, per Lord Hoffman. 
13 Note that in the ABC case commented on by Gilbar and Foster, the claimant’s reliance on Article 8 to claim a 
right to be told that her father had been diagnosed with a hereditary condition with which she too could be 
afflicted was originally unsuccessful, because of her father’s right to confidentiality under Article 8(2). 
However, the claimant’s appeal was successful, and the Court of Appeal ordered that the case be remitted for 
trial: ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 336. 
14 Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board, para 85.  
15 According to the Council of Europe Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), Article 
10(2), whilst ‘[e]veryone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her heath’, ‘the wishes of 
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed’. This Convention has not yet been signed or ratified by the 
UK. See also the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), Article 
5c: ‘The right of each individual to decide whether or not to be informed of the results of genetic examination… 
should be respected’. UNESCO Declarations are not subject to ratification and are thus not legally binding.  
16 See Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board, paras 85 and 88. 
17 See, for example, Re S (a child) (identification: restriction on publication) [2004] UKHL 47. 
18 We note that two or more individuals’ ‘rights’ might conflict in our disclosure context where AI feature more 
than one victim. This could occur if, for example, both victims know each other (they are siblings, for instance), 
both are aware of the photographs, but having been given the opportunity to decide whether or not they wish to 
be informed of future cases involving distribution and/or accessing of the AI, one victim wishes to know, and 
the other victim does not. The conflict that could then arise would be between the first victim’s right to know 
and the second’s right not to know, if it is likely that informing one will lead to the other being presented with 
information she did not wish to know. However, due to space limitations, further consideration of this scenario 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
19 Our argument in this section is specific to our disclosure context involving AI victims; we are not considering 
the suitability of a rights-based approach in the criminal justice system more broadly. 
20 When V1’s autonomy is violated in this way, there is also an interesting question of whether there should be a 
potential action under private law, namely the tort of negligence, for injury to autonomy (see generally Keren-
Paz, 2017). 
21 For discussion of the mental trauma this can cause, see the following sub-section. 
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22 X and Y v. Netherlands [1985] ECHR 4. We would thus challenge Harris’s and Keywood’s contention that a 
right not to know is inconsistent with Article 8. This contention is premised on their position that ‘it is difficult 
to argue that ignorance, a state of non-knowledge, is instrumental in the furtherance of any of the values that 
underpin the right to privacy’ (Harris and Keywood, 2001: 430). If, however, we view an unsolicited 
disclosure as an invasion of the AI victim’s spatial privacy rather than a right to remain in ignorance, the 
connection with Article 8 is apparent.   
23 See, for example, the definitions of a victim provided in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 1985: ‘persons who… have suffered harm, including physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights…’, Annex A.1, 
at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r034.htm, and in EU Directive 2012/29/EU: ‘a natural person 
who has suffered harm…’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2012): Article 2(1)(a)) 
(see also Dignan, 2005: 65; Sank and Caplan, 1991: 6). 
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